An Overview of Tajikistan’s Geopolitical Situation

Tajikistan’s Relations with Its Neighbors

Since the Central Asian states gained independence following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, their borders and relations with one another have remained the subject of numerous conflicts, though these are often overlooked by the broader international community. Tajikistan is no exception—a country that declared its independence on September 9, 1991, with a population of approximately 10.5 million people, and Emomali Rahmon, who has served continuously as “president” of the republic, with its capital in Dushanbe, since 1994. The country faces many challenges in this rather unstable region of the world. Tajikistan remains in a long-standing dispute with Kyrgyzstan over border demarcation and natural resources. Adding to its challenges is a conflict with the recently resurgent Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, from whose territory groups operate with the aim of destabilizing or even eliminating the Tajik state and replacing it with an Islamic regime. Adding to Tajikistan’s woes is the challenge of balancing the influences of two regional hegemonies: the rapidly growing economic power that is the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian Federation, which considers itself the patron and guarantor of independence for all of Central Asia. Pressure from Russia is further intensified by the fact that the perpetrators of the recent terrorist attacks on Crocus City Hall near Moscow have been identified as citizens of Tajikistan. Relations with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are also sometimes strained due to dependencies regarding the distribution and management of natural resources—primarily water—by the countries of the region. The authorities in Dushanbe must now develop a strategy that will protect Tajikistan from all external threats and allow the country to capitalize on the current geostrategic situation to fully realize its economic potential. But what are the main challenges facing the Tajik government, and how could it improve its situation?

Let’s start with the issue that is most critical for the entire region: access to fresh water. The main problem in this regard is the uneven distribution of water resources among the countries of the region, resources that are essential for all of them to develop agriculture and livestock farming. The main rivers of Central Asia are the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, which have their main sources in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This leads to conflicts with these countries’ neighbors, particularly with Uzbekistan, since more than 20% of that country’s GDP depends on agriculture, with a particular focus on cotton cultivation—a crop of which Uzbekistan was once one of the world’s largest exporters. It is worth noting that Tajikistan is the most agriculture-dependent country in Central Asia, but the difference between it and Uzbekistan is this: Tajikistan possesses the freshwater resources needed for agricultural development within its own territory, whereas Uzbekistan is dependent on external access to such resources. This causes tensions between the two countries. In contrast, the water dispute with Turkmenistan is not as critical for Tajikistan as it is for Uzbekistan, since Turkmenistan’s economy relies far less on agriculture. The reason for this is that over 90% of the country’s GDP comes from the extraction and export of natural resources, primarily natural gas. However, drinking water is still needed to meet the most basic needs of Turkmenistan’s population living in the southern part of the country. Conflicts over access to water are further exacerbated by another aspect of its use. Over 90% of Tajikistan’s electricity comes from hydroelectric power plants. However, any dam built on any of the rivers threatens to restrict water supplies for Uzbekistan’s agriculture and the Turkmen population. The issue of water access also causes tensions between two countries that are relatively well-supplied with water. Specifically, in 2021, a brief open armed conflict broke out between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, claiming 90 lives. In 2022, another confrontation claimed 100 lives. These were linked to Vorukh, a Tajik enclave within Kyrgyzstan, and the conflict over control of the region’s water infrastructure. It was not until 2025 that the two countries signed an agreement establishing the division of territory along the border and access to infrastructure. 

Let’s now turn to another issue complicating relations between the countries of the region. Namely, international terrorism and the presence of organizations such as ISIS-K in Central Asia. ISIS-K, or the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, is a group that intensified its attacks following the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria by an international coalition in 2019, becoming one of the most active Islamist cells in the world. The group gained the most notoriety following the 2024 attacks in Kerman, Iran, and the attack on Crocus City Hall in Russia. ISIS-K was based primarily in Afghanistan, where it fought against the forces of the international coalition. The situation changed in 2022–2023, when a counteroffensive by the newly formed Taliban government forced ISIS-K cells to disperse. The authorities in Kabul succeeded in significantly weakening ISIS-K’s structures in Afghanistan and limiting its ability to control territory. As a result of these events, the group took on a more international character, moving away from a focus on Afghanistan itself—from which it had been partially driven out—in order to expand the scope of its operations and target key forces in the region. The incidents in Iran and Russia serve as evidence of this. Since the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan, Tajikistan has adopted an openly hostile stance toward them. Emomali Rahmon accused the new government in Kabul of being a source of terrorism and extremism. However, it was precisely the reversal of his expectations in this regard—and the hardline stance the Taliban took toward ISIS-K—that proved more detrimental to the Tajik state. This is because ISIS-K focused its new operations on recruiting Tajik citizens. However, this did not take place within Tajikistan itself, where intelligence services maintain tight control and secularism is one of the government’s guiding principles, despite the country’s predominantly Muslim population. Instead, the recruitment targeted Tajik economic migrants working abroad—of whom there are quite a few—since in 2024, nearly half of Tajikistan’s GDP (approximately 48%) came from remittances sent by Tajik citizens working abroad. This was precisely the case with the perpetrators of the attack on Crocus City Hall, who had already been recruited and radicalized within the Russian Federation. Furthermore, in April 2024, German security services arrested seven individuals linked to ISIS-K who were planning attacks on German soil; as many as five of them were Tajik citizens. As these events show, ISIS-K’s indirect withdrawal from Afghanistan has placed an even greater burden on the government in Dushanbe and posed a threat of radicalization to Tajik citizens. When discussing the Taliban, one cannot fail to mention Jamaat Ansarullah. This is an organization of Tajik Taliban operating from within Afghanistan. It operates mainly along the Afghan-Tajik border, at times even serving as an Afghan border guard. Unlike ISIS-K, it maintains close ties with the Taliban, benefiting from their approval and logistical support, and aims to overthrow the secular government in Tajikistan and establish an Islamic emirate in Dushanbe. Because of this group, the Tajik government’s attitude toward the Taliban regime has remained openly hostile since 2021—that is, since the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan. For these reasons, relations between Kabul and Dushanbe are today de facto nonexistent, and the only action taken by Tajikistan toward the Afghan state is the continuous fortification of its southern border and an attempt to completely seal it off against a potential terrorist threat, which, according to Dushanbe, originates from Afghan territory. According to the U.S. State Department, it is precisely these two groups—ISIS-K and Jamaat Ansarullah—that pose the main terrorist threat to Tajikistan, though there is a clear distinction in what that threat entails. The Islamic State of Khorasan is primarily responsible for the radicalization of Tajik citizens abroad, while Jamaat Ansarullah poses a direct threat to the government in Dushanbe. 

Investments from China are helping to fortify the country’s southern border. Tajikistan is, in fact, a major focus of interest for the government in Beijing. This is influenced by the geographical proximity to China, with which Tajikistan shares its eastern border, but also by Russia’s waning influence due to Moscow’s military engagement in Ukraine. Tajikistan’s border with China appears to be the most stable today. This is mainly due to an agreement that Dushanbe signed with the People’s Republic of China in 2011, under which Tajikistan ceded part of the Pamir Mountains to the PRC and, in exchange, received from Beijing a waiver of rights to territories in the interior of the country. Chinese investments in Tajikistan’s mining industry also contribute to the relatively good relations between the Asian giant and Tajikistan. China helped save the Tajikistan Aluminium Company (TALCO) from collapse. TALCO is a state-owned mining giant and serves as the de facto foundation of the Tajik economy and the main source of hard currency for the authorities in Dushanbe. China’s assistance in the country’s economic development is most evident in a $200 million investment in TALCO’s subsidiary, TALCO Gold, in which the Chinese giant Tibet Huayu Mining holds a 50% stake. In 2024, the PRC was Dushanbe’s most important trading partner in terms of both imports and exports. However, this trade is quite uneven. In a fairly predictable and obvious way, trade benefits the Chinese side more. The Chinese import mainly natural resources from Tajikistan. In 2024, as much as 61% of Tajik exports to China consisted of metal ores. Trade in the opposite direction, however, is much more diversified, with no single dominant sector. Beijing sells Dushanbe a much wider range of goods, the value of which is significantly higher. In 2024, imports from China cost the Tajiks $3.5 billion, while exports in the opposite direction were valued at only $343 million. As the data above shows, China appears to treat Tajikistan primarily as a market for its products and a source of raw materials. This does not change the fact that Beijing is currently Dushanbe’s most important source of foreign direct investment. Between 2000 and 2023, China invested as much as $6.4 billion in Tajikistan. By comparison, Tajikistan’s GDP in 2023 was approximately $12.2 billion. 

Tajikistan remains one of the Central Asian countries whose foreign policy is most heavily influenced by geographical and security considerations. Conflicts over water resources, instability in Afghanistan, threats from terrorist organizations, and growing rivalry among major powers force the authorities in Dushanbe to pursue a multifaceted foreign policy. At the same time, the country possesses assets that can foster its development, primarily significant hydropower resources and its growing importance as a participant in regional infrastructure and trade development projects. Tajikistan’s future position will therefore be determined not so much by the country’s economic potential as by its ability to maintain internal stability, mitigate security threats, and skillfully balance the influence of key external actors.