American Nation and State-Building vs. Reality

Hundreds of years of American history can be described as one great process of nation-building. From the establishment by the English of the first colonies in Jamestown and Massachusetts Bay, through the United States’ expansion across the rest of the continent in the spirit of Manifest Destiny, to victory in both world wars and in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, countless people from around the world have contributed—and continue to contribute—to shaping American society, the American nation, and American statehood.

Hundreds of years of American civilization can be described as one great process of construction-from the establishment by the English of the first colonies in Jamestown and Massachusetts Bay, through the United States’ expansion across the rest of the continent in the spirit of Manifest Destiny, to victory in both world wars and the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, countless people from around the world have contributed and continue to contribute, to shaping American society, the American nation, and the American state. With this in mind, an interesting question arises at least from the author’s perspective—namely, how did a state, built relatively recently and based on many, often diverse models, fare when establishing statehood beyond its own borders?

This article will attempt to analyze cases in which the United States of America or institutions closely associated with it played a key role in establishing state structures beyond its own borders. The assessment will not focus on the legitimacy of the actions taken, but rather on the tools and methods used, the course of these actions, and their long-term effects in the countries under analysis.

A Brief Theoretical Introduction

Before beginning the actual analysis, it is worth clarifying what we mean by the terms “nation-building” and “state-building.”

In the international literature, “nation-building” is defined in various ways, particularly depending on what we consider a nation to be and what forces shape it. The modernist school (Gellner, Anderson), which views the nation as a modern invention, thus focuses on the state’s structural actions, the development of the press, and processes of industrialization and urbanization. In contrast, primordialists (Geertz, van den Berghe) and neo-perennialists (Hastings, Smith)who argue that various forms of nations have existed since the dawn of history—might cite factors such as language, religion, shared symbols, and traditions as contributing to ethnic crystallization. Regardless of the criteria adopted, the fundamental goal of nation-building processes—whether bottom-up or top-down—is to achieve national integration (Mylonas, 2020). Nation-building can be broadly defined as a series of processes that lead to the formation of a national community and, in a contemporary context, also aim to achieve convergence between that community and state structures (Mylonas, 2020).

Why does the above definition specify that this is how it is understood by international scholars? Because it should be noted that Americans have long preferred—and continue to prefer—the term “nation-building,” which is used by the U.S. political class and institutions in a much broader context and often as a “ ” concept synonymous with “state-building” as understood by the international community. Therefore, since American actions will be analyzed, these terms may be used interchangeably and refer to what is generally defined as “state-building.” It is worth noting that the term “third-party state-building” (Mylonas, 2020) can be found in the literature, which better describes what Americans mean by “nation-building.”

State-building can be simply defined as the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones (Fukuyama, 2004). It takes various forms—ranging from the literal construction of state structures from scratch to the establishment of government legitimacy and public trust in the administration. In its most basic form, state-building takes place through domestic actions. Today, however, external forces or international organizations often intervene in this process, and their contribution is viewed with considerable ambiguity, frequently encountering resistance from local societies.

Now that we’ve covered the theory, let’s move seamlessly on to an analysis of examples of how the “world’s policeman” has handled state-building beyond its own borders.

Approach One: The “Liberia” Experiment

Before discussing contemporary examples, let’s go back for a moment to the early 19th century to examine what we might describe as the Americans’ first attempt to build a foreign state.

In December 1816, the American Colonization Society (ACS) was founded—an organization that set out to address the pressing issue of slavery in the United States in a, shall we say, unique way. The ACS’s goal was to establish a colony for free African Americans. The society’s members believed that the integration of former slaves into American society was impossible. Interestingly, the ACS included both abolitionists and supporters of slavery. The latter, fearing a rise in the population of freed slaves, saw this initiative as an opportunity to “get rid of” them from the country, as they feared these freed slaves might serve as role models for their brothers still in bondage in the South.

In 1822, a group of settlers, with the support and financial assistance of the United States government, arrived on the coast of West Africa and established a colony, which was named Liberia two years later. The American influence was evident everywhere—from the nearly identical flag, to a constitution clearly modeled on the U.S. Constitution, to the capital, Monrovia, named in honor of then-President James Monroe. The colonists’ dreams of a free, black-ruled republic quickly collided with reality—the grueling conditions of the tropical jungle killed many of them, and the local population was openly hostile. To add to the irony of the situation, the settlers openly discriminated against the indigenous people, who for many decades lived in conditions of segregation from the political elite that had arrived from across the ocean . Moreover, it wasn’t long before Washington lost interest in the initiative, which ultimately failed to gain support from the ruling class, abolitionists, slaveholders, or—most importantly—freed Black people from the northern states.

As American support waned, the colony gained increasing autonomy, eventually declaring independence in 1847, although it was not officially recognized until the Civil War. Liberia, however, remained heavily dependent on support from Washington, both financial and military. The United States repeatedly aided the government in Monrovia in its fight against the indigenous population and by providing numerous loans. In return, the Americans exercised control over the country’s foreign and fiscal policies at various times. The ruling minority, the Afro-Americans, who at their peak constituted about 5% of the population, exercised full political power over the state until the coup d’état in 1980. Until that point, they lived in complete separation from the rest of society, residing in neighborhoods whose architecture was reminiscent of the Southern states.

Ultimately, the colony in Liberia went down in history as a niche and decidedly unsuccessful attempt to resolve the problem of slavery in the United States. According to estimates, a maximum of 20,000 settlers from America arrived at the colony, including several thousand people rescued at the time from the Atlantic slave trade, which accounted for less than 1% of the Black American population at the time. After the overthrow of the Americo-Liberian regime, the already impoverished Liberia descended into chaos, enduring a succession of authoritarian governments, two protracted civil wars, and economic crises.

The Americans’ Greatest Postwar Successes—Germany and Japan

With the end of World War II, the global influence of the United States—the undisputed leader of the victorious coalition—increased dramatically. This was due to the fact that, unlike in the period following World War I, the United States did not retreat into isolationism but actively participated in shaping the new world order, serving as its chief architect. This process involved an unprecedented commitment of resources and manpower to reconstruction and humanitarian aid, not only for its allies but also for its recent adversaries. And this was not merely a matter of supporting economic reconstruction or providing material assistance to affected populations, but of implementing fundamental political reforms and establishing new state structures. Immediately after the end of hostilities, the Americans thus began nation-building in Germany and Japan—prime examples of how this process, when carried out in the American style, can yield positive, long-term results.

At the time of its surrender, Germany lay in ruins—state structures had collapsed, the army had been shattered, the economy had collapsed, and millions of displaced people had no roof over their heads nor access to food. A significant portion of them, forcibly brought to the Third Reich either as slave labor or as concentration camp prisoners, were in dire straits and far from their homelands. The scale of the defeat was total. In this situation, the victorious powers began their occupation, dividing Germany into four zones, each administered separately by one of the powers. This quickly gave rise to problems—the Allies did not share a unified vision for the shape of postwar Germany, and amid the emerging Cold War, fundamental differences between the approaches of the Soviet Union and the Western powers became increasingly apparent.

The United States took the lead in building a new German state. American actions were based on the “4D principle” formulated in Potsdam (Denazification, Demilitarization, Decartelization, and Democratization), and they also sought to coordinate their occupation policies with those of the United Kingdom and France. Initially, the Allies’ priority was the complete dismantling of the Nazi apparatus of power and bringing its representatives to justice, as well as dismantling the remnants of the Wehrmacht and the German arms industry. Actions on this front were carried out quickly, efficiently, and without encountering significant resistance. The army, its command structures, and other paramilitary organizations ceased to exist, and as early as November 1945, the Nuremberg Tribunal began proceedings to try key figures responsible for the actions of Nazi Germany. Responsibility for punishing lesser representatives of the former regime fell to smaller tribunals operating at the level of the occupation sectors. 

American state-building efforts in Germany were largely grassroots in nature. In addition to the creation of a new police force at the central level, the process of building German civil society began at the local level. Gradually, starting with the smallest municipalities, the military sector administrations transferred more and more authority to the administration being rebuilt. The reforms to the education system introduced by the Americans, as well as the protection of fundamental civil rights and freedoms, were also crucial. As early as January 1946, the first free elections were held in the American occupation zone, taking place in local communities with populations of up to 20,000. Over the following months, elections were held at the state level. The democratization process accelerated amid growing tensions with the Soviet Union—the American occupation zone merged with the British one in 1947, and two years later, national elections were held, leading to the formation of Konrad Adenauer’s government, which, with Western support, continued to build democratic institutions.

When discussing Germany’s postwar reconstruction, economic recovery must also be mentioned. The Third Reich’s economy, based on autarky and monopolized by large corporations, had been almost completely destroyed. Among the Allies, the issue of resuming economic activity in Germany was a source of tension, and initially, this reconstruction was limited to sectors intended to meet the basic needs of citizens. Over time, however, both the Americans and the British came to the conclusion that building a free-market, industrialized German economy was crucial to ensuring the smooth functioning of the new, democratic state. Consequently, the United States provided Germany with significant humanitarian aid and a series of loans at that time, while seeking to limit the obligation to pay reparations—a measure to which the French were particularly strongly opposed. These measures, combined with the Marshall Plan launched in 1948 and support from newly established international institutions, led to very rapid economic growth. Among the factors contributing to this growth were a series of domestic fiscal reforms, such as the replacement of the Reichsmark with the Deutsche Mark and the abolition of many regulations from the Nazi era.

When Japan signed the instrument of surrender, it was not in as dire a situation as Germany. By yielding to U.S. terms following the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the country avoided total destruction; nevertheless, the Allied bombings caused significant damage. The economy was on the verge of collapse; many millions of people were either homeless as a result of the war, had been displaced to occupied territories, or had been brought to Japan as forced laborers. Approximately four million soldiers had been mobilized to defend against a planned American invasion, and it was unclear whether they would lay down their arms. Despite this, the government, the state administration, the parliament, and the local bureaucracy remained fully functional and ready to cooperate with the United States, and Emperor Hirohito, who enjoyed widespread respect among the Japanese people, still sat on the throne. It is worth noting that, unlike the Allied occupation of Germany, Japan was not divided by the victorious coalition and came under full American control. General Douglas MacArthur, appointed by President Truman as commander-in-chief of the Allied occupation forces in Japan, wielded virtually unlimited power over the defeated adversary, as international oversight was largely illusory.

Even before the arrival of American troops, the government of the new Prime Minister, Naruhiko Higashikuni, had begun demobilizing the Japanese army. After the official start of the occupation, General MacArthur decided that the Japanese should continue the disarmament process under American supervision. It proceeded smoothly and without major difficulties—by the end of 1945, Japan’s armed forces and their high command had ceased to exist. This was the first indication that the model of occupation adopted by the Americans differed fundamentally from the one implemented in Germany—the United States exercised authority through Japan’s existing institutions. Instead of dismantling them and rebuilding them from scratch, they were left in place and, over time, given a more democratic character. The exception was Okinawa, which was administered directly and was not returned to Japanese control until 1972.

This approach to the occupation stemmed primarily from the Americans’ reluctance to invest too many funds and resources that were needed elsewhere. However, recognizing that funding was necessary for democratic changes to be accepted by the public, MacArthur successfully lobbied for increased aid. This aid was particularly needed following the collapse of Japan’s food distribution system. Due to its mountainous terrain, Japan relied heavily on imports in this area, which had all but dried up. This was compounded by the worst rice harvest in over 30 years. The additional humanitarian aid shipments negotiated by MacArthur saved millions of Japanese from starvation.

A key decision, made against the overwhelming majority of public opinion in the United States, was to keep the Japanese imperial dynasty on the throne. Although the monarch’s role was reduced to a purely symbolic one, this ensured public acceptance of the reforms. Hirohito completely broke with the previous tradition of the emperor as a near-deity, actively touring the country and boosting civilian morale.

In addition to a reluctance to spend excessive resources, the American decision to utilize the existing Japanese administration was also dictated by other, more practical factors. First, the breadth and efficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus constituted a significant asset. Second, the language barrier proved to be a difficult hurdle to overcome. The Americans did not have a large number of personnel who could speak both Japanese and English and possessed the necessary skills to manage day-to-day affairs. Consequently, the occupation was de facto limited to issuing general directives to the Japanese authorities and monitoring and supervising their actions. For a long time, economic matters were an exception, as the Americans retained direct control over them.

The first stage of democratization, as in Germany, was the prosecution of government and military officials responsible for wartime actions and crimes. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, established for this purpose in Tokyo, operated on principles identical to those of its Nuremberg counterpart. The difference lay in the scale—Japan did not possess a large-scale apparatus of state repression nor did it establish concentration camps, although the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in the occupied territories by Japanese soldiers was just as criminal as in the case of Germany. For these reasons, the number of Japanese convicted was significantly lower than that of Germans. Additionally, the vast majority of those tried were members of the military and paramilitary organizations. After several years, the Japanese government was given the opportunity to review these sentences, and many of those convicted regained their freedom and political rights. Another similarity to the occupation decisions in Germany was the establishment of a police force. To this end, the existing Special High Police was dissolved, and in its place—despite Japanese resistance—a decentralized organization was established. It was centralized again after the occupation ended.

After the constitutional amendments proposed by the Japanese government proved unsatisfactory, the Americans’ primary tasks became drafting a new Japanese constitution and carrying out educational reforms. The changes introduced were significant—the emperor’s role was reduced to a minimum, parliament assumed the central political role, men and women were granted equal rights, and, most notably, Japan was stripped of its armed forces and the right to declare war. Although the document provided by the Americans contained translation errors and its language sounded unnatural to the Japanese, it was ultimately accepted and remains unchanged to this day. The first free elections under the new constitutional order were held as early as April 1946 . Meanwhile, educational reform eliminated from schools all manifestations of the imperial cult, state-promoted religion, and Japanese nationalism. As with the police, the changes were carried out in the spirit of decentralization, basing the new educational system on the American model.

The Cold War altered the course of Japan’s economic reforms. Initially, an ambitious reform program—aiming for full liberalization and granting numerous rights to workers—was curtailed by pragmatic considerations. The proposed breakup of Japan’s zaibatsu—huge business conglomerates—sparked controversy. Washington demanded that this process begin quickly, but MacArthur opposed it. Ultimately, the breakup and the introduction of antitrust regulations did take place, but the process was unsatisfactory, and many of the former owners retained their influence. Another issue—ensuring workers’ right to organize—also caused problems. Japanese communists began to build their influence within some of the newly formed labor unions. Fearing that the communists would take control, as well as the negative impact of union activity on economic stability, Washington limited their influence. The agricultural reform carried out between 1946 and 1950 proved to be a great success, and its positive effects are still felt today. The Korean War turned out to be the key factor that enabled the Japanese economy to flourish. Until the war broke out, Japan faced the problem of a lack of foreign markets, and due to its geographical proximity, it played a key role in the conflict. The increase in demand for Japanese products resulting from military operations significantly boosted trade revenues.

The cases of postwar reconstruction in Germany and Japan demonstrate that the United States, through its nation-building efforts, is capable of creating stable, prosperous, and democratic states. Common features of the processes in both countries include a focus on holding the former, pro-war political elite accountable and on democratization, the implementation of sweeping free-market economic reforms, and the “leniency” of the occupation. American soldiers, who until recently had been enemies, became a symbol of humanitarian aid. Another key factor was the relatively rapid transfer of control over domestic politics to the occupied nations through free elections. The culture and historical experiences of the occupied countries also worked in the United States’ favor. Before the Nazis came to power, Germany had a functioning, albeit not very stable, democracy and was not culturally distant from the Americans. Japan, on the other hand, had undergone a process of Western-style modernization, laying the foundations for a system of democratic government, albeit one that was severely limited. Of course, the occupation policies toward Germany and Japan differed, primarily in the use of local administrations and the involvement of other international actors. Nevertheless, their outcomes are identical—both countries became democratic economic powers, with stable institutions and broad civil rights.

Staying in Asia-South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam

After discussing the nation-building processes in Japan, let’s remain on the Asian continent for a moment to examine U.S. actions in other countries in the region. The Korean War, mentioned a moment ago, forced the United States to become involved in the affairs of the peninsula. Previously, American priorities lay elsewhere entirely; Korean issues were not a major concern for many in Washington. In an effort to prevent the spread of communism, the Americans deployed significant resources to Korea, both to defend it militarily and to build a stable state there capable of fighting on its own if necessary.

American efforts in Korea, supported by an international coalition under the auspices of the United Nations, began during the invasion from the North and gained momentum after the war ended in 1953. A number of American and international reports identified the following as the main challenges in modernizing the country: a lack of infrastructure and industry, an inefficient agricultural sector, and a Korean society trapped in its postcolonial past and lagging in development, which, due to decades of Japanese-style education, lacked adequate schooling. Compounding these problems was the enormous scale of destruction resulting from the war.

Measures initiated during the American occupation from 1945 to 1948 led to the implementation of effective agricultural reforms, the laying of the foundations for industrial development, and a complete overhaul of the Korean education system. The mission of the education system, beyond teaching the skills needed to build a modern economy, became the creation of a new society that believed in progressive ideals and technological advancement. The effects of generous American financial involvement in the postwar years were visible, although Washington considered them unsatisfactory. The situation changed, however, and the “Miracle on the Han River” became a reality largely thanks to U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The administration of President Park Chung-hee actively supported the United States, which in return not only increased its investments but also created demand for Korean products. At that time, the Americans fulfilled a significant portion of their military orders in the Republic of Korea. President Park also laid the groundwork for an export- and trade-oriented economy and normalized relations with Japan, which attracted numerous Japanese investors to the peninsula. It was during the Vietnam War that the chaebols—large business conglomerates—emerged; to this day, they account for the majority of South Korea’s GDP and form the foundation of the country’s modern economy.

The process of nation-building in the Republic of Korea lacked a key aspect—the democratization of power. As the years passed, the administration of the first president, Syngman Rhee, became increasingly authoritarian, corrupt, and unpopular both among the country’s citizens and in Washington. The United States blamed the Rhee administration for unsatisfactory economic performance. However, during his presidency, it became apparent that the American reforms dating back to the 1940s had produced a somewhat unexpected result—they had shaped a new, pro-democratic Korean society. The first manifestation of this was President Rhee being forced to step down from office following the rigged elections of 1960. This was achieved as a result of an unexpected wave of protests. However, the parliamentary system introduced later proved ineffective in managing many problems inherited from the previous administration, which led to General Park Chung Hee’s military coup as early as 1961. The new president, mentioned earlier, steered the country back onto an authoritarian path while maintaining Washington’s support. It was not until the bloody suppression of the protests in Gwangju in May 1980 that further changes were catalysed. Although this did not force the then-president—the military dictator Chun Doo-hwan—to step down, the dormant democratic sentiment was reignited. It should be noted that the Americans did not speak out against Chun’s administration following these events, fearing the destabilization of Korea in the midst of the ongoing Cold War. In the years that followed, Koreans, through numerous strikes and protests, gradually forced the military to relinquish power, culminating in free elections in 1987. Since then, South Korea has not only had a developed, modern economy but also democratic institutions and a wide range of civil rights. One could summarize this by saying that the democratic values which the United States did not immediately provide to Korea were nevertheless rooted so deeply in society that the people managed to fight for them on their own.

The Philippines came under U.S. rule formally after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, and de facto after the Americans defeated Filipino nationalists four years later. Through the Philippine Commissions, particularly the Second Commission—also known as the Taft Commission—the process of nation-building in the Philippines began. Based on the American model, the foundations of democratic state structures, an independent judiciary, and the legal system were established. A public school system—unlike anything seen during the Spanish rule—was built, and civil rights, the arts, and the press were promoted. Under de facto American rule, a national tradition and Filipino culture emerged in a process known as “Filipinization.” During this process, the Americans, who had assumed administrative positions after occupying the country, began to hand them over relatively quickly to the local elites. Philippinization proceeded so effectively that in the first free elections to the Philippine Assembly in 1907, the Nationalist Party won a decisive victory over those who favored incorporating the Philippines into the United States as a full-fledged part of the country. In turn, as early as 1913, the Second Philippine Commission, established by the Americans, was composed mostly of representatives from Manila rather than Washington. It should be noted, however, that the Americans supported factions favoring “Philippinization” and influenced its direction, viewing this process as more effective in building statehood than attempts to impose American cultural models.

Although the United States fared significantly better than Spain in nation-building in the Philippines, it did not create a paradise on Earth there. It was not without reason that Americans referred to the Philippines at the time—especially in less formal conversations—as a colony. The islands were meant to be a model example of American exceptionalism—an idea that posited the uniqueness and moral superiority of the United States over the rest of the world. In building Philippine statehood, the Americans were thus guided largely by ideological premises, which gave rise to problems that persist in the Philippines to this day. Consequently, the nation-building process itself was not without its flaws. Above all, it lacked significant investment in the economy and infrastructure. The example mentioned earlier of building an education system almost from scratch is impressive; however, as a result, more than half of Filipino children remained outside the school system. Ethnic and religious minorities, although nominally granted equal rights, faced numerous forms of discrimination from the descendants of Spanish colonists and Tagalogs, who were favored by the Americans. In this way, the United States exacerbated the growing internal divisions. Upon achieving full independence in 1946, the Philippines—though built on solid democratic foundations—struggled with many postcolonial problems caused by American rule.

Until Washington began to seriously fear a domino effect in Asian countries, Vietnam held little interest for the Americans. Circumstances, however, forced them to commit substantial resources to efforts aimed at defending the South against the communists from the North, as well as at building stable state structures there. The administrative apparatus inherited from the French had been designed to protect French interests and was unsuitable for the effective governance of an independent Vietnam, particularly in rural areas—the key base of support for the communists. After taking power in 1955, President Ngô Đình Diệm, with clear American support, began to rule in an increasingly authoritarian manner. The elections agreed upon at the Geneva Conference did not take place, and nepotism and corruption were widespread within the administration. The opposition and the Buddhist majority were openly repressed. The resurgence of communist guerrilla activity in 1959 and the formation of the Viet Cong two years later further accelerated the chaos that was already taking hold in the country.

In this situation, more and more American soldiers and military advisers began to arrive in South Vietnam, gaining increasing influence over the functioning of the state. The main problem initially was the lack of a unified vision among the Americans. At the same time, individual representatives from Washington took uncoordinated actions—for example, one faction sought to strengthen President Diệm’s central authority and the institutions under his control, while another was simultaneously working to expand the powers of local administrations in order to build support in rural areas. Another problem was the army, modeled on the American one, which was ill-suited for unconventional warfare against a dispersed guerrilla force. The competence of Vietnamese commanders also left much to be desired. Following the overthrow of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime and Lyndon Johnson’s assumption of the presidency in the United States in 1963, there was a significant revision of U.S. policy in Vietnam. The increased American involvement following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 required radical and coordinated action. This led to the creation of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in 1967. This was the best-organized U.S. effort to date aimed at stabilizing the State of Vietnam, and it achieved some success in pacifying the Vietnamese province. However, no measures could help South Vietnam, which had been weakened just a few months later following the Tet Offensive. Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops initiated by President Nixon—which was ultimately completed in 1973 under the terms of the —the war ended with a victory for North Vietnam and the fall of Saigon two years later. Of all the American nation-building initiatives during the Cold War, South Vietnam can, without much doubt, be described as the greatest and most painful failure. The United States not only suffered a military defeat, losing tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars invested in the South, but also lost the state-building contest to communist North Vietnam, which was able to build a functioning state during the war.

A Reality Check in Somalia

Leaving Asia aside for a moment, let’s turn to Africa in the 1990s. After rebels seized Mogadishu, President Barre’s regime collapsed, and the civil war raging in Somalia entered a new, more chaotic and bloody phase. Anti-government warlords and the clans supporting them turned against one another, launching a struggle for control over the entire country. The economy collapsed completely, and millions of people suffered from starvation or were forced to flee their homes. This dramatic situation forces the international community to intervene in order to stabilize the de facto failed state. Although the mission is officially led by the UN, the United States provides the lion’s share of the personnel and budget.

In order to restore stability and the foundations of Somali statehood, UNOSOM I, a UN-led operation, was launched in April 1992. Its task was to monitor the fragile ceasefire in Mogadishu and ensure the safety of humanitarian convoys. After encountering significant resistance from Somali warlords, it was reinforced in December by the U.S.-led UNITAF mission. The two operations were merged in May 1993 into UNOSOM II, whose mandate was expanded to include efforts aimed at the reconstruction and democratization of Somalia. Paradoxically, although UNOSOM II’s scope was significantly broader than that of its predecessors, it involved fewer personnel, which affected the program’s effectiveness.

After the authorization of a direct U.S. operation, the situation began to improve. A contingent of 28,000 U.S. troops effectively deterred warlords from challenging the mission’s activities. Thanks to UNITAF, humanitarian conditions were relatively stabilized, particularly with regard to food supplies. Within a short time, numerous roads, basic sanitation facilities, and public institutions—such as hospitals and schools—were rebuilt. It is worth noting that one of the reasons for UNITAF’s success was its clearly defined command structure and excellent coordination of activities with other members of the international coalition within the framework of UNOSOM I.

The situation changed dramatically after the establishment of UNOSOM II. The first obvious problem was the reduction in the number of personnel participating in the operation, coupled with a significant expansion of its scope of activities. Furthermore, unlike UNITAF, the mission’s command structure was designed in an unnecessarily complicated and ambiguous manner. This led to a renewed deepening of the crisis. The practice of warlords appropriating international humanitarian aid and distributing it to their loyalists rather than to the country’s suffering population intensified. Warring factions resumed their fierce challenge to the authority of the foreign mission, and the complex structure of UNOSOM II hindered an effective military response. In their attempt to build the democratic foundations of the state, the United States and the UN failed to take into account one extremely crucial issue—Somali society had been characterized by strong clan divisions for centuries. In building the statehood of the future Somalia, virtually no resources were devoted to attempts at national reconciliation. Throughout the process, available resources steadily dwindled and were inadequate for the mission’s needs. The reason for this situation was internal pressure in the United States following the failure of Operation Gothic Serpent in October 1993. As a result of the downing of two Black Hawk helicopters during the operation—which, incidentally, is where the term “Black Hawk Down” originated—eighteen American soldiers were killed. Consequently, the Bill Clinton administration began systematically reducing American involvement in the operation. Ultimately, this led to the dissolution of the UN mission and the withdrawal of international forces in March 1995. More than two years of operations, largely funded by Washington, came to nothing, and chaos in Somalia continues to this day.

Interventions in the Balkan Cauldron

The breakup of Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s brought years of bloody war to the Balkans, followed by a period of painful stabilization and difficult reforms. This process took its most drastic turn in Bosnia—war broke out almost immediately after the country declared independence in April 1992. Ethnic issues were the main flashpoint. The divide between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats—which had remained dormant during the Yugoslav era—resurfaced with a level of brutality not seen in Europe since World War II. The conflict was finally brought to an end by a coordinated Bosniak-Croat offensive in August 1995, combined with airstrikes carried out by NATO countries. As a result, the Serbian side was forced into negotiations, which—mediated by the Americans—led to the signing of the Dayton Agreement on December 14, 1995.

The agreement ended hostilities and gave rise to one of the most unique state structures in the modern world. The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, comprising the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—divided into ten autonomous cantons—and the Republika Srpska, a unitary entity that also enjoys broad autonomy. Since central institutions did not yet exist at the time the agreement was signed, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was established. The High Representative, appointed by the international community, was granted extraordinary powers to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. These powers include making binding decisions in the absence of goodwill on the part of the parties, or removing from office politicians who threaten the functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This office continues to exist today, sparking controversy within the country due to its lack of democratic legitimacy and questions surrounding the selection of the most recent High Representative, the German Christian Schmidt.

Responsibilities for Bosnia’s reconstruction were clearly divided—the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was responsible for military matters, while the Office of the High Representative (OHR) handled civilian affairs. IFOR achieved significant success, leading to the rapid disarmament of troops stationed along the former front line and the restoration of relative calm in the country. However, this division also led to serious problems; namely, jurisdictional disputes arose over issues not specified by the Dayton Agreement, and the two sides—although both originating from allied organizations—paradoxically cooperated poorly with one another. This stemmed from the fact that the United States sought to maintain greater influence within the NATO mission, thereby weakening the OHR, which was closer to the European Union. The situation was not helped by the fact that progress on civilian issues was proceeding significantly more slowly than on military ones. When the September 1996 elections led to a political impasse, the OHR’s powers were expanded and used to strengthen the previously established structures of central government. A Central Bank was created, a single currency was introduced, and such fundamental matters as the adoption of a national flag and license plates were resolved. It is worth noting that American influence on the decisions made during this period remained strong.

Despite numerous difficulties, state-building efforts continued. After a year, IFOR concluded its mission; however, NATO did not withdraw completely, and allied troops remain stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, serving as one of the pillars of the country’s stability. The war-torn economy has recovered, hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned to their homes, a significant portion of the country has been cleared of landmines (although to this day Bosnia holds the dubious distinction of being the country with the highest number of landmines per capita in Europe), but above all, a solid foundation for democratic institutions and political culture has been established. Ethnic divisions remain a key factor threatening the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly Serbian separatism; however, the progress made since Dayton in building national reconciliation is evident. Today, Bosnia is a country with considerable development potential and is actively seeking to join NATO and the European Union.

The end of the war in Bosnia did not mark the end of all military operations in the region. Taking advantage of the growing turmoil, Slobodan Milošević, then president of Serbia—which was part of Yugoslavia at the time—abolished the autonomous status of Vojvodina and Kosovo in 1989. In Kosovo, this eventually led to the emergence of an armed resistance movement against direct rule from Belgrade. The methods used by the Serbs to pacify the Albanian insurgents often resulted in excessive destruction and numerous civilian casualties. The escalation forced NATO countries to intervene, first diplomatically and ultimately through an intensive airstrike campaign dominated by U.S. aircraft. After 11 weeks of bombing, Yugoslavia—which still formally existed—withdrew its troops from the disputed region. In cooperation with the UN, a provisional administration was established for Kosovo, in which NATO assumed responsibilities related to the military, security, and internal affairs, with the United States playing a key role. Civilian matters were overseen by structures established by the UN.

In accordance with the agreement, Yugoslav forces finally withdrew on June 20, 1999, along with more than 100,000 Serbian civilians. About half that number of Serbs remained in Kosovo, concentrated in enclaves mainly in the north, occasionally resisting international forces and, above all, the Albanians. Within the framework of NATO, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established, a peacekeeping force that remains stationed in Kosovo to this day. They succeeded in restoring relative calm to the region by providing a significant portion of the initial humanitarian aid and by efficiently disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army. UN efforts proceeded much more slowly, but over time, the foundation for democratic state structures was established. Contrary to fears, the first free elections in November 2001 resulted in a victory for moderate political forces, but a problem arose in forming a governing majority—a problem that would recur many times in the future. In contrast to the aforementioned efforts, which were largely shaped by the United States, the European Union took the lead in economic reconstruction, which generally yielded very good results.

The key issue that has never been resolved is the question of Kosovo’s final status. Pristina declared independence on February 17, 2008, but international recognition of this move has been mixed. Serbia, of course, did not recognize the declaration, and Kosovo’s accession to the UN is being blocked by China and Russia, which support Serbia. Furthermore, Serbs are exploiting their minority status to destabilize the internal situation in the territory controlled by Pristina. The conflict flares up from time to time, most often over the still-contentious issue of Serbian license plates. Despite ethnic divisions and recurring crises in forming stable governing coalitions, Kosovo has solid democratic structures and continues to develop, aspiring to integration with the European Union. However, until an agreement is reached with Serbia—which is not yet in sight—Kosovo’s future remains unclear.

The Legacy of the War on Terror-Afghanistan and Iraq

Having discussed a series of U.S. interventions from the more distant past, it would be impossible to conclude this article without addressing the two most recent—and likely the most deeply ingrained in the public consciousness—attempts by the United States to build foreign states. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States deployed its armed forces in a series of interventions around the globe, targeting “state sponsors of terrorism” and organizations of that nature. The “war on terror” shaped American foreign policy in the early 21st century, but it also created a need to reconstruct territories brought under Washington’s control.

The first invasion took place less than a month after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. After the Taliban, who ruled Afghanistan, refused to hand over Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda leaders, the United States, leading an international coalition— —launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7. As a result, by the end of 2001, the Taliban had lost power to the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance, whose leaders formed an interim government. Its task was to rebuild the economy and state structures in a democratic spirit—at least on paper. The international community was supposed to support the reconstruction effort, although by far the largest share of funding for the effort came from the United States.

With strong foreign support, the new government was able to achieve tangible successes. Relatively stable structures of government and public administration were built almost from scratch, and basic civil rights and freedoms, as well as the rights of ethnic minorities, were established. For the first time in Afghanistan’s history, free presidential elections were held, which were won in 2004 by the leader of the interim government, Hamid Karzai, and a parliament was elected a year later. The process of economic reconstruction began, most visible in the larger cities. Particular attention should be paid to the issue of women’s rights, which did not exist under the rule of the radical Islamist Taliban. Women regained the ability to attend school, work, and exercise their political and electoral rights, securing representation in the newly elected parliament.

However, the positive aspects of the reforms implemented by the new Afghan authorities were almost entirely overshadowed by numerous unresolved and newly emerging problems. The government was virtually entirely dependent on foreign financial and military support. This situation was not helped by the fact that the main aid provider, the United States, lacked a coherent vision for Afghanistan’s future and structure. The Americans often took contradictory actions while attempting to simultaneously stabilize the situation in the country and implement democratic reforms. These inconsistencies, combined with chronic government instability and rampant corruption, created ideal conditions for the resurgence of Islamist movements that had never been fully eradicated. The resumption of fighting by the new Taliban and other terrorist organizations further fueled the spiral of chaos in the country, a situation exacerbated by the inept attempts at centralizing power by Afghanistan’s second president, Ashraf Ghani.

After Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011, the Barack Obama administration accelerated the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, while simultaneously attempting to strengthen government forces. This did not yield the expected results, and as the number of foreign troops dwindled, the local army was unable to combat the Taliban, which was growing in strength. The steadily deteriorating situation increased public pressure in the United States to bring American troops home, particularly after President Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. His first administration intensified direct attempts to negotiate with Taliban representatives, essentially bypassing the government in Kabul. These efforts culminated in the signing of the Doha Agreement on February 29, 2020, in which Washington agreed to a full withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan in exchange for the Taliban ceasing its support for terrorism. The Afghan government was not a party to the agreement. The responsibility for fulfilling the agreement fell to President Joe Biden’s administration, which announced in April 2021 that the last U.S. troops would leave Afghanistan by September 11. However, as early as May , the Taliban launched a massive offensive against government forces. On August 15, Kabul was captured, President Ghani fled the country, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ceased to exist. At the same time, a chaotic and humiliating evacuation of the remaining U.S. personnel and associated Afghan civilians began, finally concluding on August 30.

Tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars, two decades of nation-building efforts, and the lives of several thousand American soldiers were completely squandered. The return of the Islamist Taliban to power in Kabul completely destroyed everything that the American-backed regime had built. Afghanistan has once again proven that calling it the “graveyard of empires” did not come out of nowhere.

Less than two years after Operation Enduring Freedom, it was time for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United States, with the support of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland—the so-called “coalition of the willing”—invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003. In addition to liberating the Iraqi people from the rule of Saddam Hussein, who “supported terrorism,” Washington cited the need to destroy weapons of mass destruction as a reason for the invasion. According to U.S. intelligence, Baghdad was still stockpiling such weapons, despite having been forced to destroy them after the First Gulf War. The failure to find the alleged arsenal during the occupation of Iraq, as well as the lack of UN authorization for the invasion, sparked widespread controversy and criticism even from the United States’ closest allies.

Coalition troops were by no means welcomed as liberators by all Iraqis. Armed resistance against the occupation, as well as the chaos caused by the collapse of Hussein’s regime, prevented the swift reconstruction and democratization of Iraq promised by the Bush administration. Prior to the invasion, there was no organized internal opposition that enjoyed public support and the legitimacy to form a government. The overthrow of Ba’athist rule unleashed religious and ethnic conflicts that had been kept in check by authoritarian methods. While in the north of the country Arab militias fought the Kurds over oil-rich territories, Sunnis and Shiites clashed in the south. As a result of these fighting, many members of the middle class fled Iraq, which significantly hampered the reconstruction of the economy.

The American occupation policy left much to be desired. Above all, a fundamental mistake was the lack of a vision for how to turn Iraq into a democratic country. Washington’s approach is well summed up by the following quote: “[…] Iraqi politicians in exile were brought back to the country as new leaders, and it was hoped that democracy and economic development would automatically spread throughout the region” (Scholvin, 2011). In an effort to eliminate representatives of the ousted regime from public life, the Americans purged the administration of all individuals associated with the Ba’athist movement, which effectively paralyzed the functioning of government institutions. The United States favored not only the émigré political elite but also local tribes that had provided military support for operations against al-Qaeda. This sparked public resistance, which intensified even further following the parliamentary elections held in January 2005. As a result of a boycott or the inability to vote in dangerous areas, the majority of Sunnis did not participate, and the central administration was dominated by the Shia and Kurdish minorities.

Despite these difficulties, a new constitution was adopted that same year, laying the foundation for democratic institutions and establishing autonomy for the Kurds in the north of the country. However, this did not resolve the fundamental ethnic and religious disputes that continue to dominate Iraqi politics. The coalition’s intervention formally ended in 2011, leaving the country riddled with problems in nearly every sphere of activity. The country’s instability allowed radical Islamism to resurface in the form of the Islamic State in 2014. Even after its defeat, it is difficult to speak of a fully functioning and stable Iraq.

The most recent examples of American nation-building in the 21st century have ended in failure—a complete debacle in Afghanistan and results in Iraq that fell far short of expectations. The myth of Uncle Sam bringing freedom to oppressed nations has been put to a harsh test, and in America itself, the enormous costs of failed interventions have led to a rise in isolationist sentiment. In both cases, a series of glaring mistakes were made and numerous oversights occurred. The situation in Iraq may be particularly surprising, not only because of the obviously flawed reasons for launching the invasion there, but also because this was not the first time that a failed state-building process had occurred there. Not only did the Americans fail to learn from previous Ottoman or British attempts, but they also repeatedly made the same mistakes, such as favoring specific tribes or minorities.

In Summary

The examples mentioned in this article do not, of course, represent all instances of American nation-building in history. Numerous U.S. interventions in its own backyard—that is, in Latin America and the Caribbean—have not been discussed. These include events such as the creation of so-called “banana republics,” the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and operations in Haiti—a country that holds the absolute record  for the number of U.S. nation-building missions; depending on the criteria used, there have been three or four such missions.

What conclusions can we draw? American nation- and state-building is a highly ambiguous phenomenon. In the past, the United States has been able to create states with durable structures and democratic values—Germany, Japan, South Korea, Bosnia and Herzegovina—though, of course, not without difficulties. Washington’s efforts yielded the best results when the Americans held a clearly dominant position in the countries under analysis, with limited involvement from other actors. The reconstruction of postwar societies and the instillation of democracy in them also produced lasting results, as did close cooperation with local communities and leaders. On the other hand, the problems the United States faced in its failed missions included a lack of a unified vision and inconsistent actions, attempts to make decisions without respect for the traditions and cultural characteristics of the countries, as well as support for authoritarian governments and a lack of grassroots democratic reforms.

The American approach reflects the synthesis of concepts—namely, traditional nation- and state-building—that was noted at the outset. The United States not only established basic state structures and strengthened their legitimacy, but also permanently transformed the culture of these societies by exporting democratic models from its own backyard. The most successful examples—such as those in Germany, Japan, and Korea—serve as models here, where educational reforms and the associated changes in shaping new generations constituted one of the foundations of these transformations.

Looking at the most recent manifestations of nation-building by the Americans, the noticeable increase in negative perceptions of Washington’s actions on the international stage—including among its own allies—should come as no surprise. If the United States were ever to establish state structures beyond its own borders, its past interventions serve as both an excellent example of how it should be done and, at the same time, of how such a process absolutely should not look.